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the entire purchase price... .
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He reasons that the conditional

sales transaction is a transfer to the buyer of the beneficial interest in the goods with title reserved to the vendor solely for the
purpose of securing the purchase price. Therefore, there is no
inconsistency between an action for the price and subsequent
resort to the security by retaking the goods where payment of
the price has not been forthcoming through the previous action.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the courts
are sharply divided on this controversial question, and the possibility of immediate unanimity among them is highly improbable.
The better reasoning is the minority rule, but this has had little
persuasive effect upon the majority. Therefore, in the absence
of legislative direction, the courts in the majority-rule jurisdictions will continue to apply the "harsh" doctrine of election of
remedies.
Thomas R. King
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IAwYvr.
By Albert P. Blaustein1 and Charles
0. Porter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 360.
$5.50. The authors of The American Lawyer, have distilled the
essence from the tremendous mass of material assembled by the
American Bar Association's survey of the legal profession2 to produce a remarkably concise, well integrated and extremely readable book. Mr. Blaustein, a professor of law at New York Law
School, who obtained first hand knowledge of the problems involved while acting as Special Studies Consultant to the survey,
along with his co-author, have thus made accessible information
that would otherwise have remained unavailable. Few libraries
have complete sets of survey reports and few lawyers or scholars
the time to read the thousands of pages that comprise the 175
separate reports.
The book deals with and explores in great detail the process
of becoming a lawyer, the status and functions of lawyers in our
society, the availability of their services and the ethics of the
law. Far from just a compendium of thought provoking facts
and statistics, the work is self critical to the extent that the role
of the lawyer is evaluated in terms of the needs of the public
THE Ammuc
2

1 Professor of Law, New York Law -School.
2 Member of the Oregon Bar.
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and constructive insofar as remedial measures are suggested and
discussed.
As a woman member of the legal profession the reviewer was
interested to note that the authors found obvious need for improvement in regard to the status of women lawyers. The Survey
reports that they are kept in a special category in terms of numbers, opportunities, sphere of professional activity and public
relations within the bar. Quoting from the Survey's consultant
in this field the authors found that "when it comes to women
who enter the law, the majority of large law offices still refuse
(short of war) to interview them for jobs. Women must work
twice as hard as men for half the pay."
The studiously objective and impartial presentation of facts
which characterize every chapter is nowhere more apparent than
in the treatment of trial by newspaper. Lawyers almost unanimously disapprove the release by the bar of comments to the
newspapers on pending or anticipated litigation but question
whether adherence to a Cannon of Ethics commendatory of such
practice would be feasible in view of the demands of the press
and the public for information.
The issue of trial by newspaper brings into conflict two basic
rights - freedom of the press and the right of an individual to
a fair and impartial trial; but the problem is not insoluble. A
campaign of edutation to create a public demand for fair play
together with increased responsibility by the press and the bar
can eliminate an evil that unchecked might well destroy due
process of law.
There are certain noticeable gaps in the book. While the functioning of women lawyers has been considered, the degree to
which color, religion or race affect the status of lawyers has not
been treated. The role of the lawyer as a law maker has been
touched upon only in regard to legislative drafting. It would
have been interesting to learn the extent to which lawyers as
writers of law books and legal articles have influenced the growth
and development of the law. These omissions, however, cannot
be laid at the door of Messers. Blaustein and Porter as they were
not covered by the survey reports.
Beyoiid doubt, not only will this book be of great interest to
every lawyer, but it will serve as a guide to legal educators and
bar associations in planning improvements in the administration
of justice. It will also serve as an inspiration to the bar for the
maintenance of the considerable contribution and achievements
of the legal profession.
Edith L. Fisch*
*

Member of the New York Bar.
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CONTRACTS, CASES AND TEXT. By George L. Clark." Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954. Pp. 816. $9.00 This
book by Professor George L. Clark is one of a series of casebooktextbooks published by the Bobbs-Merrill Company. The books
are available both in combined form, casebook-textbook in one
volume, or separately. However, the purpose of the publication
is such that the resulting volume varies in many respects from a
simple joining between the same covers of the usual casebook and
the usual textbook.
Professor Clark points out in his preface that there is adverse
criticism of the present methods used in teaching law and that
there are many quite diverse views of what and how much should
be included in the formal legal education. He believes that the
different conditions obtaining today call for a new method of
teaching. "Today, in all law schools, students are required to attend classes at least twelve hours a week and every school is conducted on either a semester or quarter basis, so that it is not possible for them to make careful summaries of their courses.
Further, the casebooks are much longer; and since there is no
summary of the course, the casebooks are discarded as useless. . . "The result is that instead of the case method as it was
practiced at the Harvard Law School some fifty years ago, there
is, largely, merely the study of cases - an entirely different
thing.' 2 He thus suggests that the use of this new type of book
will help answer these problems.
The size of the new book is proof that Professor Clark is
making no attempt to produce a conventional book. Instead of a
book as large as a casebook plus a textbook, we find a book
smaller than the usual casebook alone. The casebook covers 578
pages and the text about 180 pages. A comparison with one of
the longer casebooks3 indicates that Professor Clark intends no
minor change in teaching methods. Because of the difference in
size of pages, the new book has only one-third the space available
in Corbin's book. It contains 209 cases, whereas Corbin's contains some 450 cases, not to mention many important but short
cases showing historical development. That he has been able to
include as many cases as he does in the space available is in itself no small accomplishment. This is accomplished in part by
the omission of any break between cases except the fourteen
chapter headings. The cases are not preceded by textual comment nor are the chapters divided into subheadings. The cases
I Former member of law faculties of Stanford University, University of

Illinois, University of Michigan and New York University.
2 Text at iv.
3 CoRBN, LAW OF CONTRACTS

(3d.Ed. 1947).

1955]

BOOK REVIEWS

are not followed by problems, questions, or citations. A comparison of the eight cases in the chapter on Offer and Acceptance
that also appear in Corbin's book reveals that the space available
has been used to the fullest advantage. There has been a very
careful and competent omission of sentences, rewriting of a few
sentences, and some omission of citations. These omissions have
obviously not been made merely to save space, though the saving
is from two or three lines to a fourth of a case. The resulting case
is completely satisfactory. Moreover, the cases themselves are
chosen very carefully: the leading cases are included as well as
a sufficient number of recent cases to make the contents reflect
current law.
But these statistics are somewhat misleading. Naturally, to
clear up the distorted view, it is only necessary to supply a few
further statistics. There is agreement in the two books on the
importance of a few chapters and disagreement on others. Hence
the more than two to one ratio of cases in Corbin's book to those
in Clark's is not maintained on a chapter to chapter basis. For
example, in the chapter on Offer and Acceptance, the ratio is 65
to 43, on Consideration 84 to 41, on Discharge of Contracts 58 to
9. The casebook-textbook contains no cases on remedies.
The text differs as widely from the average text as does the
casebook. Professor Clark says, in discussing the purpose of the
text, that "The textbooks of the series are readable and understandable, being written primarily for the student; it is expected
that they will to some extent take the place of the summaries
made by the students in the days now long past."4 It will be
readily admitted that there is no overstatement in the first part
of this description, for the text is certainly readable and understandable. There is no doubt that the students will read the text
and will find it useful. It may be doubted that it will serve the
purpose of a summary prepared by the student himself.
The 180 pages of text is preceded by a four page table of
contents the chapter headings of which are the same as the chapter headings to the casebook. The subheadings are extensive
enough to be useful as is the twelve page index that follows the
text. It is to be regretted that the casebook itself contains neither
the subheadings in the table of contents nor an index of any kind.
Of course the absence of the subheads and index is undoubtedly intended as part of the method of the use of the book. At
least it will require the student himself to decide why each case
is used. Nor will he obtain much aid from the text in placing the
cases, for only about one out of ten -only the leading cases are mentioned in the text. One part of the author's purpose
I Text at v.
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seems somewhat doubtful of attainment. The student will still
have to organize his notes -and he will probably have more
notes - if he intends to use them for review purposes. He will be
aided in having the text as a guide and perhaps in having discussed some of the textual material as he goes along. He will
also have a much more detailed analysis of many of his own
cases than he finds in his text. However, the new book will be
a valuable teaching tool in the right hands. It is to be hoped that
someone who uses the book will write a review discussing the
problems he finds in its use, his method of integrating the textual
material with the cases, and the value of the book as shown
under actual classroom use.
Hugh W. Divine*

STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMNERCE. By Paul J. Hartman.Y Buffalo: Dennis & Co., 1953. Pp. xi, 323. $7.50.-The old
quip that death and taxes are certain is once again belied in the
ever changing field of state taxation of interstate business by the
recent deaths of Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Jackson, which
may presage a new shift in the Supreme Court's approach to state
taxation under the Commerce Clause. In 1938 a new liberalization of state taxation under the commerce clause was charted out
by the enunciation by Justice Stone of the multiple taxation doctrine. No longer was a tax to be invalidated merely because it
was imposed on an exclusively interstate business. The Commerce Clause was found not to create an area of trade free of
state taxation, but merely to prevent the risks of imposition on
the nation-wide businesses of cumulative burdens of taxation not
borne by local business. Under Justice Stone's aegis and after
death under the leadership of Justice Rutledge (with the aid of
Justices Douglas and Murphy and at times of Justice Reed, while
Justice Black followed his own .more sweeping view that nondiscriminatory state taxation is valid under the Commerce Clause
until Congress acts) the Court began to hew out a new series of
decisions. These holdings and the accompanying opinions indicated that fairly apportioned franchise, gross receipts and income
taxes could be applied to interstate businesses without violating
the Commerce Clause. And at the same time, the area of local
activities subject to state taxation - in sales taxation and in some
local privilege taxes -was extended. Where the Court found
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest College Law School, Wake
Forest, North Carolina.
1 Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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that a particular, unapportioned levy, if upheld, would subject
the taxpayer to the risk of a cumulation of similar levies in other
states, if tended to uphold the tax as an imposition on an intrastate activity.
In 1946, however, under the leadership of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with strong support from Mr. Justice Jackson and the vote
of Chief Justice Vinson, at times supported by Justice Reed and
more recently Justices Burton and Minton, a reversion to the
ancient regime set in. The multiple taxation doctrine and its
keystone, apportionment, were cast under a shadow and at times
repudiated; "direct taxes" on interstate commerce and taxes on
the "very flow of commerce" were declared to be invalid, irrespective of the absence of danger of multiplication of taxation.
Perhaps the high point (or low point, depending on one's view
of the retrogression to pre-1936 thinking) was reached in the
Spector case, 2 where a doing business tax measured by net income fairly apportioned to the state, was invalidated as applied to
a trucking company maintaining extensive terminals and pick-up
facilities in the taxing state. The court relied on the metaphysical
dogma that a levy called a tax on the privilege of doing business
is per se invalid under the Commerce Clause. This was about the
temper of the latest decisions when the author completed his
work in 1953.
The first three chapters of Professor Hartman's are devoted to
a critical analysis of the broad doctrinal developments through
which the Commerce Clause has gone. They provide an excellent
introduction for students of state taxation under the Commerce
Clause. Two features of this analysis are especially noteworthy,
isince they have often been neglected. First, there is the author's
comparison of the regulartory cases with the tax cases and his
criticism of the propriety of the view that in the silence of Congress "interstate commerce may not be taxed at all," while at the
same time the Court recognizes in regulatory cases the existence
of a concurrent power of commerce by the states and the federal
government. Likewise, the author points up the frequent intermingling, often confused and unarticulated, 3 of Due Process
Clause issues with Commerce Clause problems.
The author is severely critical of the pre-1938 views of the
court, now largely reinstated, as ". .. overzealous in protecting
interstate commerce ... at the expense of local interests.. . ," as
2

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).

3 Mr. Justice Rutledge made a notable contribution to the disentangle-

ment of Due Process considerations from Commerce Clause issues. See
Abel, The Commerce Power: An Instrument of Federalism in Mr. Justice
Rutledge - A Symposium, 25 IND. L.J. 498 (1950).
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placing local business at a competitive disadvantage with interstate business. 4 The distinctions drawn are characterized as
"arbitrary," "unrealistic," "unreliable" and "mechanical" and the
entire approach as "conceptual." 5 The author is generally sympathetic to the multiple taxation test, which he characterizes as a
"pragmatic approach" that avoids the "mental gymnastics" involved in trying to ascertain whether there is a locally taxable
event and in which practical consequences become the test of
constitutionality in a new "wholesome philosophy." 6 The author's
view of the "truth" of the matter is to be found in Justice Clark's
statement that interstate commerce "receives adequate protection
when state levies are fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory." 7
'The author concludes that two alternatives are open; either the
court can ". . . abandon its present position of granting tax
immunity to interstate commerce; or Congress, by giving consent,
can clear the constitutional path for local taxation." Because he
finds the prospects of achieving taxability by judicial decision
alone dim, Professor Hartman recommends Congressional action.
Without detailing his program, the author advocates Congressional legislation prescribing the permissive limits of state
taxation through the authorization of certain types of levies and
the prohibition of others, including the establishment of acceptable allocation methods. Such proposals have been more fully
examined by other students in the-field.
It is the irony of the fates that the ink was hardly dry on
Professor Hartman's work before straws appeared in the wind
that we may be in for a new swing of the constitutional pendulum
in which the majority may again embrace Justice Stone's multiple taxation approach to state taxation under the Commerce
Clause. In September, 1953 Chief Justice Vinson died and President Eisenhower made his first Supreme Court appointment by
designating Chief Justice Warren as Vinson's successor. Vinson
had generally been a member of the old guard on the bench in
commerce clause-state taxation decisions. The new Chief Justice
appears to have become a part of the avant garde by joining in
Mr. Justice Clark's dissent (along with Justices Douglas and
Black) in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia,9 in which,
quoting from his dissent from the Spector case, Justice Clark
reiterated his view that a "nondiscriminatory state tax fairly ap4 Text at 261.
5 Id. at 263-65.
6 Id. at 271.
7 Id. at 274.
s Ibid.

9 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
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portioned and not excessive ... may properly be levied against
a corporation which obviously could not engage in interstate
commerce in the state without using the facilities and services
of the state." Now death has removed Justice Jackson, one of the
most effective of the supporters of the pre-1938 doctrine, whose
trenchant opinions gave a modern touch to the philosophy of the
ancient regime. The appointment of Judge Harlan as successor to
Justice Jackson indicates the delicate balance on which may hang
the great issues of the limitations on state taxation imposed by
the Commerce Clause.
In assessing Professor Hartman's work, it is pertinent to observe that the author set for himself the task of including every
case decided by the Supreme Court relating to state and local
taxation of interstate commerce. And nothing has been observed
in this reviewer's reading of the work to suggest that he failed
to achieve that objective. Therein, however, lies the weakness
of the work; a 285 page volume (ex tables and index) cannot
hope to deal satisfactorily with this vast field (although upwards
of 400 cases are cited). It has already been noted that the introductory chapters provide a useful, well thought-out, basic analytical survey of the field. The bulk of the work, however, suffers
from the attempt to do too much; chapter by chapter the author
deals with the cases covering specific types of levies- property
taxes, local activity and privilege taxes, sales and use taxes,
gross receipts taxes and capital stock taxes. To illustrate some
of the results which flow from seeking to deal with a study of
such magnitude within so brief a compass, the author devotes
26 pages to a chapter entitled "Local Activity Taxes." He devotes
five pages to a discussion of "multi-state business and occupations" in which he considers in cryptic manner the cases dealing
with the intermingled local and interstate business. While at
one point he tells us that "[a] tax may be validly imposed for the
privilege of engaging in a local business or occupation, even
inseparably connected with interstate business, where the tax is
not demanded as a condition of continuing to do any business,"' 0
at another point he declares that "where local and interstate business are intermingled, and are so inseparable that the taxpayer
could not discontinue the local business without withdrawing
also from the interstate business, there is some confusion in the
opinions on whether a privilege tax may be imposed upon the
local aspects."" If the business referred to in the first sentence is
"inseparably connected with the interstate business," it would
seem to fall within the category of intermingled businesses in
10 Text at 105.
11 Id. at 106.
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which the local business cannot be given up without yielding the
interstate business. In any event, if there is a distinction between
the two situations, the reader is left to find it for himself in
the cases. The author declares that the rationale of the cases
seems to support the taxation of such intermingled businesses.
However, two cases were decided in 1953,12 both cited by the
author, in which there are ominous rumblings that the doctrine
established by the earlier cases relied on by the author may be
in for re-examination and may be destined to be overruled. These
developments are not observed by the author.
In the same chapter, there is a brief reference to Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 13 in which a divided court upheld an
excise tax which it treated as a levy on the maintenance of an
interstate pipe line within the state, although it was conceded
that the taxpayer was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The case is referred to in a pedestrian fashion in the
chapter and it is cited at several other points in the work, but
nowhere is there a considered review of the case. This was in
many ways one of the most remarkable cases in the field in that
it allowed a privilege tax in an admittedly exclusively interstate
business, while the court was proclaiming that the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce could not be taxed. It was
decided two years later than Freeman v. Hewit,14 which the
author properly regards as having "shunted aside" the multiple
taxation doctrine. Nevertheless, the place of the Memphis case
in the constitutional scheme of things is at no point seriously
considered by the author.
In the 49 page chapter devoted to sales and use taxes, which is
one of the most comprehensive studies made by the author of any
type of tax, there is an incomprehensible failure to recognize or
even to advert to the significant contributions made to the
Commerce Clause tax field by Justice Rutledge. His opinion
in the McLoed v. Dilworth; General Trading Company v. State
Tax Commission; and InternationalHarvester Co. v. Department
of Treasury (a single opinion delivered in all three cases)1 5 is
one of the most notable pieces of apalysis and original thinking
'in the books. Justice Rutledge's forthright analysis of the alternatives open to the court in dealing with sales taxation, his realistic
recognition that the task before the court is one of judicial states12 City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953),; Bode v. Barrett,
344 U.S. 583 (1953).

13 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
14 329 U.S. 249 (1946).

15 322 U.S. 349 (1944).
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manship, his critical evaluation of the choices to be made and his
development of the multiple taxation doctrine deserve a high
place in our constitutional annals. It is particularly surprising
that the importance of Justice Rutledge's contribution was not
discerned by Professor Hartman in view of his preoccupation
with the economic and practical results of the Court's decisions.
Such shortcomings may be inherent in a work of vast scope
sought to be compressed within severely limited space. Moreover, in the opinion of this reviewer, intensive law review studies
dealing with most of the specific aspects of the problems covered
by the author have done a more thoughtful, a more critical and
a more comprehensive job than is done by Professor Hartman. I
should like to press one more point - the weakness of the portions of Professor Hartman's work under discussion lies not
merely in space limitations; it requires long and lingering reflection and concentration on the materials and problems within a
specific area, along with a broad understanding of the overall
field, to do the kind of thinking and analysis that, for example,
Professor Powell and Professor Lockhart have contributed
through their studies of various specific aspects of state taxation
under the Commerce Clause. Perhaps a Powell, after a lifetime
of intensive study and teaching and writing in virtually every
branch of state and local taxation under the Commerce Clause,
could write (doubtless covering several volumes the size of
Professor Hartman's) an adequate detailed study of the entire
field, which would deal satisfactorily with all the decided cases,
but in the absence of such extraordinary talents and study and
waiting, I am skeptical about the success of even such an effort.
All this is not to suggest that the chapters dealing with specific
levies are pedestrian or without value. On the contrary, the
leading cases and many of lesser importance are usually critically
analyzed and at every point put in the perspective of their practical and economic consequences. The work is the most complete
critique to date of the entire body of decisions from the multiple
taxation vantage point. It should have great value to the practitioner and the law teacher in providing them not only with a
handy and useful summary as well as a critical analysis of the
cases. For the scholar in the field, however, its usefulness will
be of more limited value. For Professor Hartman has not written
an acceptable treatise in the field of state taxation under the
Commerce Clause.
Jerome R. Hellerstein*
* Member of the New York Bar; author of "State and Local Taxation:
Cases and Materials"; Assistant Professor of Law, New York University
Law School.
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